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Many of the greatest debates in philosophy take the general form of conceptual analysis.  We find evidence for philosophical positions by analysing relevant concepts.  This process is familiar to all with even a superficial understanding of the literature on causation, identity, morality, justice, grammaticality and knowledge.  The general methodology of these debates is the pumping of and systematisation of our intuitions about cases with regard to that concept.  For example, Edmund Gettier provided cases where the justified true belief analysis of knowledge​[1]​ predicts that Smith has knowledge but our intuition is that he does not (1963).  These counterexamples spurred an incredible amount of conceptual development and analysis of knowledge in an attempt to find a new systematisation which accords with newly-discovered intuitions.  Thought experiments like these are the main source of development in philosophical theories.

Given the ubiquity of intuition-driven conceptual analysis, the recent attack on it by experimental philosophers is especially worrying to defenders of the traditional methodology.  Briefly, experimentalists bring a two-pronged attack, one prong empirical and the other theoretical.  First, they have produced a series of experiments which provide evidence that intuitions about cases are not as stable as philosophers had hoped.  Second, experimentalists have argued that the best explanation of our philosophical intuitions makes no reference to any facts, but only to personal psychological concepts (Stich 1975; Goldman 2007; Ross, Ladyman et al. 2007).  Given that we are only justified in believing in those entities which are part of the best explanation of our evidence, we are only justified by our intuitions in believing in concepts and not in facts.  I call this the explanationist objection.





Frank Jackson neatly summarises the practice of conceptual analysis in metaphysics: 
Metaphysicians seek a comprehensive account of some subject matter – the mind, the semantic, or, more ambitiously, everything – in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions … conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary (1998, 4, 28).
Of course, this same procedure applies in other apt areas of philosophy: ethics, epistemology, some areas of philosophy of mind etc.  Conceptual analysis seeks to increase understanding of our concept usage by reducing complex concepts to sets of more fundamental concepts​[3]​.  For example, it was long thought that knowledge could be reduced without remainder to justification, truth, and belief​[4]​.  Gettier showed that this analysis does indeed leave a remainder and thus that the reduction was not successful.  This stimulated hundreds of new analyses which attempted to reduce knowledge to different component concepts, like reliability or epistemic virtue​[5]​.  The point of this kind of analysis is to speak to people in their own language.  When we ask under what conditions humans have knowledge, we could of course understand ‘knowledge’ to mean the ability to solve the Goldbach conjecture in which case we would then find that humans never have knowledge.  But we do not care whether we have knowledge in this sense; we care whether we have knowledge where ‘knowledge’ means what we generally mean by ‘knowledge.’  Conceptual analysis attempts to explicate what it is that we mean when we use a concept like knowledge so that we can investigate the properties and instantiations of something we care about​[6]​.  It is most implausible that our use of that concept is completely random or miraculously consistent, so there must be some patterns underlying this conceptual competence.  To discover these patterns is the primary goal of conceptual analysis.

A secondary goal may emerge out of this goal.  If we find, as is plausibly the case with our incompatibilist folk concept of free will, that our concept is never instantiated in the world or is deficient in some other way, we may decide it is best to change the subject in a limited sense.  We may instead analyse an interesting conception which is near enough to the folk’s conception to be regarded as a natural extension of it, which does all we expect of a concept of free will in assigning moral responsibility and punishment and is compatible with determinism (Jackson 1998, 44-45).  

Now that we have some understanding of what conceptual analysis is and what it is trying to achieve, let us look at the methodology.  We can usefully explicate the methodology by paying heed to Lakatos’ heuristic method of proofs and refutations in informal mathematics (Lakatos et al. 1976).  He suggests that a naïve conjecture and initial proof are made more rigorous and contentful by counterexamples, especially global but not local counterexamples, i.e. counterexamples to the conjecture which are not counterexamples to any lemma of the proof.  Since Lakatos’ example is quite involved, let me draw a very simple example to clarify the terminology.  Suppose I conjecture that all books occupy space.  My proof (Lakatos uses ‘proof’ to mean “a thought-experiment … which suggests a decomposition of the original conjecture into subconjectures or lemmas” (1976, 9)) is that all books are made up of pages and all pages occupy space.  This is a deductive proof: the lemmas deductively entail the conjecture.  We notice a global counterexample to this conjecture when we see that books are now available to download from the internet.  Since these books occupy no more space than the book reader, we may say that these books do not occupy space.  We then notice that we also have a local counterexample to a lemma.  Though e-books are made up of pages, these pages do not occupy space.  A global counterexample is a counterexample to the main conjecture and a local counterexample is a counterexample to a lemma of the proof.  These two types of counterexample are often separated; we will see that the most interesting type for my purposes is global but not local counterexamples, that is, counterexamples to the main conjecture which are not also counterexamples to a lemma of the proof.

Lakatos identifies four steps which are a pattern of growth for mathematical theories.  First, we begin with a naïve conjecture and second, we find a rough thought-experiment or proof which decomposes this conjecture into lemmas.  Third, global counterexamples are sought and produced.  In the best heuristic case, there is no corresponding local counterexample and so, fourth, the global counterexamples force us to examine the proof and identify the hidden, misidentified or ambiguous lemma to which the global counterexample is also a local counterexample​[7]​.  In this way, an improved conjecture based on the new proof supersedes the naïve conjecture.  Importantly, we are also forced to construct new proofs and new lemmas.

Lakatos finds three further processes often follow the development of a new conjecture and proof.  First, a search begins for uses for the new lemma or conjecture in other proofs and theories.  Second, the consequences of the naïve conjecture are checked for compatibility with the improved conjecture.  Third, counterexamples to the naïve conjecture are turned into examples of a new conjecture and new fields of enquiry become open.  It is these three final steps which really aid the development of informal mathematics.  We are forced by the heuristic method to be creative in a directed and systematic way, to be clarified below, and the new and interesting ideas we discover in this process are made useful by their applications in the original and other related areas.





To make the methodology of conceptual analysis more clear, I will give a very short account of a classic example of conceptual analysis at work: the analysis of knowledge which began in the 1960s.  Knowledge had always been taken to be true belief justified in some relevant way.  For example, Roderick Chisholm provided the following analysis: S knows p if and only if (i) p is true; (ii) S accepts p; and (iii) S has adequate evidence for p (1957, 16).  Gettier caused a great stir in epistemic circles by his identification of a simple type of counterexample (1963).  Consider Smith who has been away for the weekend.  It is late and she wants to go to bed.  She looks at the clock and it says 9:40.  It has always been a good clock and she has no reason to think that it is not now reliable.  In fact, the time is 9:40 but the clock stopped at exactly this time yesterday.  Smith’s belief in the time is true and is as justified as any of our everyday beliefs are, yet surely she does not know the time to be 9:40.  After all, it was just a fluke that her belief was right.  She could well have walked in an hour later and the clock would still have said 9:40​[8]​. 

Gettier did not provide any replacement analyses to accommodate his new counterexamples, but in the few years that followed, many many new analyses were offered.  Michael Clark was quick in providing a fourth condition: that S’s belief that p is fully grounded, where a belief is fully grounded if and only if the grounds for that belief are true, the grounds for the grounds are true and so on until it is “logically odd” to ask what the grounds for the grounds are (1963, 47).  John Saunders and Narayan Champawat then provided a counterexample to this analysis: 
Suppose that Smith believes 
(p) Jones owns a Ford 
because his friend Brown whom he knows to be generally reliable and honest yesterday told Smith that Jones had always owned a Ford.  Brown’s information was correct, but today Jones sells his Ford and replaces it with a Volkswagen.  An hour later Jones is pleased to find that he is the proud owner of two cars: he has been lucky enough to win a Ford in a raffle (1964, 8).
They argue that this case shows Clark’s definition to be too weak because surely Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford despite his belief being fully grounded.

An astounding number of counterexamples and analyses were produced in the decade or two that followed Gettier’s paper and many of the ideas generated in this discussion have been very successful (Shope 1983).  I want to concentrate only on one strand of this flood of analyses: that broadly termed explanationism.  In the epistemological literature, Gilbert Harman is seen as the originator and strongest defender of this position.  He proposes, in response to Gettier, a necessary condition of knowledge that all the lemmas be true, where lemmas may be explicit premises in reasoning or implicit assumptions (1965, 92)​[9]​.  He also presents the case of the scientist who infers the existence of unobservables from observations.  He suggests that this scientist is justified in making this inference, though we cannot account for the justification by reference to enumerative induction.  He suggests that, in cases like these, we need to appeal to the inference to the best explanation: “one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” (1965, 89).  

Alvin Goldman developed an account of empirical knowledge quite different to Harman’s, though not incompatible with it.  He suggested that the case in Saunders and Champawat’s counterexample is an example of a better theory of knowledge: “A necessary condition of S’s knowing p is that his believing p be connected with p by a causal chain” (1967, 361).  He suggests that in order to know, we must not only be connected to the world in an appropriate way, we must also be able to correctly reconstruct the important links in this causal chain.  Additionally, he allows that “if a chain of inferences is ‘added’ to a causal chain, then the entire chain is causal” (1967, 362).  That is, our beliefs must be connected to the world either by causation or by logical inference in order to be knowledge.

Harman provides what he regards as a counterexample to Goldman’s theory.  Smith finds a large number of green emeralds in varied parts of the world and diverse geological conditions and infers that all emeralds are green (1973, 127).  We regard Smith’s belief as knowledge, but the fact that all emeralds are green neither causes nor is caused by these particular emeralds being green.  Goldman attempts to account for this by allowing inferences to be added to causal chains and requiring that knowers reconstruct important links of the causal chain but, as Harman points out, any two states of affairs are logically connected because both are entailed by their conjunction.  Surely this kind of logical connection is not relevant to knowledge.  So we face a dilemma in our reconstructions.  We must account for our knowledge of generalisations using logical connections, but we must make some more fine-grained distinctions among logical connections in order only to accept relevant connections.

Harman argues that it is much more plausible, because much simpler and less ad hoc, to regard these kinds of inference and the knowledge based on them as inference to the best explanation.  It is easy to see how the fact that all emeralds are green explains the colour of the examined emeralds.  This brings knowledge of generalisations into a parallel position with scientific knowledge of unobservables.  Importantly, it also helps to account for Gettier cases.  In the clock case above, Harman suggests that Smith infers the best explanation of the clock’s reading 9:40 which includes propositions like: my eyes are reliably perceiving the clock; my clock is generally reliable; and my clock has not stopped.  This analysis of the inference helps to expose the lemmas responsible for Smith’s belief and shows their importance.  We see at once that the final lemma is false and that this is the reason that Smith does not know in this case.  Since inference to the best explanation has significant unifying power, Harman suggests that it is a better analysis of inductive and empirical knowledge.  This is the explanationist analysis of knowledge​[10]​.  Interestingly, he suggests that he developed this analysis of knowledge “in an attempt to account for Gettier examples that show something wrong with the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.  We have tried to find principles of inference which, together with [the principle that all lemmas be true], would explain Gettier’s deviant cases” (1973, 140).

Of course, Harman’s analysis is incomplete without an account of explanation and best explanation.  He does not discuss this in much detail but is obviously deferring to the then contemporary debate.  This debate began with Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s very famous (1948).  Here they argue that “the event under discussion is explained by subsuming it under general laws” (1948, 135).  Though they do not say so in as many words, their paper, and the vigorous debate which followed it, shows all the signs of intuition-driven analysis of the concept of explanation (see Pust 2000, 10).  Wesley Salmon’s history of this debate shows that the debate often takes the form of proofs and refutations discussed above (1989).  An analysis of explanation is provided, then a counterexample is found where the analysis is satisfied but we would not intuitively regard the case as explanatory, then a new analysis is given which identifies the mistaken lemma and amends it to reflect the counterexample.  The value of Harman’s explanationism obviously depends on the development of this debate and so explanationism becomes doubly dependent on conceptual analysis.

Harman made explanationism most famous with his ethics textbook The Nature of Morality (1977).  Here he argues that moral intuitions give us no reason to believe anything about moral facts because “an assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgment you make” (1977, 7).  Since by the explanationist criterion of knowledge we may only believe in those entities which are part of the best explanation of our evidence, our intuitive evidence gives us no reason to believe anything about the moral nature of the world.  Rather, we are only entitled to beliefs about the judger and her moral sensibility.

Stich applied the explanationist criterion to semantics, claiming that the best explanation of our logical intuitions made no reference to logical truth per se, but only to our logical concepts, and thus that those intuitions are evidence only for those concepts (1975).  Goldman then applied explanationism to metaphysics, arguing that our intuitions about metaphysics are evidence only for our concepts about the world and not for metaphysical facts (1992).  Metaphysics compatible with this explanationist criticism has developed into a research programme in itself, contributing much to scientifically-respectable metaphysics (for example Dennett 2005; Ladyman et al. 2007).





I propose that, because of this proofs and refutations form, conceptual analysis is epistemically valuable in an interesting oblique sense.  In the following sections, I will add substance to this claim by giving an account of oblique value and epistemic value.  I will then give reasons that make it plausible that conceptual analysis has oblique epistemic value.  These reasons cannot make a water-tight case, as that depends on extensive historical analysis, but they establish enough to validate the use of conceptual analysis and shift the burden of proof back onto the experimentalists.

A well-known example of oblique value is Adam Smith’s invisible hand argument in classical economics.  He says:
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations (1950, 49).  
There is oblique economic value here because there is value which does not accumulate in the direction of the goals of the activity.  Individuals in Smith’s model strive primarily to better their own condition and to the extent that they succeed, the processes they use have direct economic value for each individual.  But by using these processes, society happens to be carried to wealth and prosperity through the efficient distribution of resources.  This is clearly part of the economic value of the processes, but it is of a different kind to the direct value.  It is not directly aimed at by the actors, but is, from their perspective, a by-product.  To contribute to oblique value, this by-product must be non-accidentally connected to the process, as is the increase in national wealth here.  Flying a kite is not obliquely economically valuable just because some people happen to find money at the park when flying kites​[12]​.  This, then, is a brief sketch of oblique value which will be further developed with the example of conceptual analysis.  First, however, I need to consider direct epistemic value and its varieties. We will return later to the indirect or oblique epistemic value to be associated with conceptual analysis.

I am interested in three types of direct epistemic value, each at a higher level than the last.  Firstly, there is fundamental epistemic value.  These are our epistemic goals; nowadays we are most interested in states of knowledge, justified belief or some form of apt belief​[13]​.  These states need not be intrinsically valuable, but often they are valued for their own sake.  It is most helpful to conceive of these as particular beliefs about singular objects, for example, ‘this book is blue’ or ‘this belief is an instance of knowledge.’  Secondly, there is process epistemic value which is an attribute of processes of belief formation like conceptual analysis.  These processes may take place within the subject, as where one draws deductive consequences from evidence, or outside of the subject, as where one relies on chemical tests to determine the pH of a swimming pool.  The processes may also be coarse- or fine-grained.  In particular, I include among these processes fine-grained generalisations which lead to singular beliefs, for example, ‘all instances of malicious murder are wrong.’  These are processes of belief formation in the sense that when we come across an instance of malicious murder we are directed that we should form a belief about this event being wrong.  All processes which make a contribution towards the formation of the belief are included as processes of belief formation.  These include heuristics, theories, creative processes and external stimuli.  A process of this kind has epistemic value insofar as it helps us to achieve our epistemic goals and helps us to maximise our stock of fundamental epistemic value.  

Criterion epistemic value is the third kind.  It pertains to criteria which guide our processes of belief formation and declare some to be process epistemically valuable and others not.  Of course, these declarations need not be correct, as process epistemic value is an objective fact of the world.  A criterion is judged by how much it helps us to choose the correct processes and maximise our stock of fundamental epistemic value.  Criteria are especially useful in domains where it is not always clear whether we have achieved fundamental epistemic value or not.  For example, as discussed above, some claim that no knowledge is obtained of extra-conceptual moral reality by the conceptual analytic process and some claim that knowledge is obtained.  It is difficult to know whether knowledge of propositions about extra-conceptual moral reality is delivered, because there are reasonably plausible arguments on both sides​[14]​.  In order to clarify the issue, we turn to criteria, which judge whole groups of processes.  Where a criterion which maximises epistemic value in other domains rules some process of belief formation not to be process epistemically valuable, we have reason to regard that process as such.

The determination of epistemic value in the latter two senses does not rest on conceptual analysis.  It is not a question of which processes we intuitively regard as justified or valuable.  It is an empirical question about which processes in fact best help us to achieve our epistemic goals.  Of course, the determination of the content of those goals, and thus which beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value, will rely on conceptual analysis but, given such an analysis, the determination of the higher orders of value will require investigation of the non-conceptual world.  In particular, propensities to deliver epistemic goals under different conditions must be considered along with frequencies of actual delivery (Goldman 1999, 91).

Explanationism as a criterion has epistemic value in this third sense.  It helps us to achieve our epistemic goals by guiding us towards process epistemic value.  We can see this from its widespread usage in those disciplines which we regard as the most epistemically-respectable.  The disciplines which utilise explanationism consistently produce the epistemically-special kinds of beliefs which are our epistemic goals.

Science is, of course, the prime example of epistemic goals achieved in accordance with the explanationist criterion.  Indeed, as discussed above, Harman’s original example in his argument for the use of the explanationist criterion was a scientist believing in the existence of atoms and sub-atomic particles because of observable results (1965, 89).  This kind of inference is ubiquitous in science.  Of course, anti-realists will disagree, but most scientific realists will admit that fallible appeals to the best explanation are necessary to account for scientific knowledge of unobservable facts (Ross et al. 2007, 17).  If explanationism is central to science, and science is one of the most epistemically-respectable disciplines we have, then explanationism’s epistemic value is established.

In addition, it is very plausible that legal proof relies on inference to the best explanation (Pardo and Allen 2008).  When judges and juries decide whether an accused is guilty, they must infer the best explanation of the evidence before them and decide whether that explanation includes the accused’s committing the crime.  If judges in fact believe in unobservable facts based on an inference to the best explanation of the evidence, explanationism’s epistemic value is bolstered​[15]​.





We have seen that conceptual analysis, and its proofs and refutations heuristic form, is largely responsible for the philosophical interest in explanationism.  Harman developed the explanationist criterion “in an attempt to account for Gettier examples” (1973, 140).  He proposed that the best analysis of knowledge contained the necessary condition that all lemmas be true and the requirement that ampliative inference be to the best explanation.  Of course, his account of best explanation also deferred to the contemporary conceptual analytic debate about explanation.  Since conceptual analysis provided a large part of the stimulus for philosophical interest in explanationism, which is such an epistemically-valuable criterion, we may say that conceptual analysis has helped us at least once towards our epistemic goals​[16]​.  To this extent, conceptual analysis, as a process for finding epistemically-valuable hypotheses​[17]​, is itself epistemically valuable in the sense outlined above.  

My hypothesis is that conceptual analysis reliably​[18]​ produces epistemically-valuable ideas and so, as a process of belief formation, it is itself process epistemically valuable.  Conceptual analysis produces mainly hypotheses at the process level.  For example, it is claimed that conceptual analysis shows that our concept of free will is incompatible with determinism (Jackson 1998, 44).  This hypothesis is a process of belief formation insofar as it tells us what to believe whenever we come across a being whose actions are fully determined.  The processes generated from conceptual analysis, if they are right, help us towards our epistemic goals of knowledge, justified or apt belief and so the process which generates them, conceptual analysis, also helps us towards those goals.  Conceptual analysis is a coarser-grained process which gives rise to finer-grained epistemically valuable processes.  To the extent that it does, it has process epistemic value.  

There are two good reasons to predict that doing conceptual analysis will continue to generate epistemically-valuable processes.  First, right answers to conceptual analytic questions are of the right form to be valuable in other epistemically-important areas.  Second, experimentalists have provided no systematic alternative for the generation of new philosophical hypotheses.  For these reasons, it makes sense to continue to use conceptual analysis for the development of new philosophical hypotheses.

While all processes of theoretical innovation require some mechanism for introducing variation and generating new ideas, no process involves generating new ideas in a properly random manner, otherwise it would be a miracle if a scientist generated a hypothesis even in the right field, let alone accounting for the data.  Stein and Lipton suggest that this apparent guidedness of theory formulation is illusory and is better explained by hidden randomness​[19]​, as in biology (1989).  They suggest that the epistemic equivalent of biological preadaptations is heuristics which guide or restrict the production of hypotheses.  They identify two useful types of heuristics: abstract rule heuristics which apply to many areas of enquiry and favour, for example, tractable, testable, simple hypotheses; and concrete rule heuristics which are field-specific and favour hypotheses like other theoretical claims in the discipline.

We can see the operation of these heuristics in conceptual analysis, and their operation suggests that conceptual analysis will reliably produce processes of an interesting and fruitful kind.  Though it is not often discussed, theoretical virtues are as important in philosophy as in science.  Graham Priest, for example, says in relation to theory choice in logic:
If a realist account of the nature of logical relations is given, then, whatever that is, the question arises as to the criteria one should use to determine which theory is correct.  The answer to this … is that one decides on the basis of which theory is overall simplest, most adequate to the data, least ad hoc, and so on (2005, 174).
Priest refers to Kuhn’s (1977) account of the theoretical virtues to fill in the details of his “and so on”.  Kuhn identifies five criteria which are standard for evaluating theories in the sciences and elsewhere: accuracy to the data; consistency, internally and externally with well-established theories; wide scope, with consequences extending far beyond the particular observations it was designed to explain; simplicity in bringing order to otherwise-isolated phenomena; and fruitfulness for new research.  These theoretical virtues guide and restrict hypotheses in almost all areas of scholarship and so should be considered abstract rule heuristics.

Concrete rule heuristics are similar to Kuhn’s exemplar paradigms: concrete achievements which theorisers look to for guidance on the content and form of subsequent developments in that field (Kuhn 1996, 10).  Achievements regarded as exemplary for philosophy have almost always, at least in modern times, been conceptual analytic.  Gettier’s paper ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ was certainly exemplary, having almost completely changed the way philosophers think about knowledge by a couple of imaginary examples.  Kripke’s Naming and Necessity did the same thing for reference.  These two examples, taught universally to philosophy undergraduates and studied extensively by philosophers, respectively provide paradigms for the provision of counterexamples and the formulation of new analyses and theories.

Because conceptual analysis requires answers which take these forms, the problem space to be searched for an acceptable analysis is reduced.  Heuristics guide our analysis so we do not have to exhaustively examine each irrelevant possibility; as Campbell says, “In constructing our ‘universal’ library we stop work on any volume as soon as it is clear that it is gibberish” (1960, 393).  So, in response to any problem situation in conceptual analysis, the heuristics ensure that potential solutions have the right form for analyses.

The heuristics that guide hypothesis formation in conceptual analysis also guide hypothesis formation in other interesting areas.  Epistemological hypotheses developed through conceptual analysis have the same structure as metaphysical and ethical hypotheses because all utilise these same concrete rule heuristics.  And philosophical theories have the same structure as scientific and high-level social theories because they share the same abstract rule heuristics.  Theories generated from conceptual analysis are of the right form to be applicable to other areas of philosophy by virtue of shared concrete rule heuristics and to other areas of scholarship by virtue of shared abstract rule heuristics​[20]​.  

Indeed, if, as is claimed by Stich, “[n]o commonsense concept that has been studied has turned out to be analysable into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions” (1992, 250), and thus counterexamples to proposed analyses are endless, the capacity of conceptual analysis to produce interesting results is only increased.  Far from impugning the value of conceptual analysis, the unending cycle of analysis and counterexample provides unending opportunities for the producing of fruitful results.  With each new problem situation, we have another opportunity to generate a result with interest for the problem at hand, other problems in philosophy and other problems in wider areas of interest.  The labour is Sisyphean, but more rewarding because of that.

This point is crucial to the oblique epistemic value of conceptual analysis.  Conceptual analysis reliably produces epistemically-valuable hypotheses because, in a large part, the hypotheses it generates are of the right form to be valuable in other domains – they are guided by the same abstract and concrete rule heuristics which guide hypothesis formation in other interesting areas.  It is a reliable method of production because the proportion of epistemically-valuable hypotheses it produces is above some threshold.  Admittedly, this threshold is very low, but we expect an idea-generating mechanism to have a low proportion of successes simply because it produces such a large number of contenders.  We are seeking marginal gains here.  It is unreasonable to expect a theorising mechanism which produces any serious number of hypotheses to produce mainly or only epistemically-valuable ones.  Rather, we must content ourselves with the modest advantage delivered by conceptual analysis' only offering hypotheses of an epistemically-valuable form.  

The epistemic value of conceptual analysis looks especially good when the experimentalist critics propose no systematic alternative for generation of new hypotheses.  Let us examine one positive epistemological proposal from Jonathan Weinberg as an example of a hypothesis generated outside conceptual analysis.  Weinberg argues that any putative source of evidence that is hopeless ought not to be trusted (2007).  A hopeless source of evidence is one without the capacity to detect and correct its errors.  This is an interesting and plausible epistemological criterion which makes us consider seriously our use of intuitions in philosophical theorising​[21]​.  

Weinberg does not discuss how he generated the hopelessness hypothesis, but we may make some conjectures from his defence of it.  His defence is mainly composed of references to the criterion’s implicit usage in other domains.  He shows, for example, that the acceptance of electron microscopy in biology depended on scientists' being convinced that its deliverances were not hopeless.  Further, he claims that a hopelessness criterion is at work in our judicial practices and in good quality journalism, both fields with well-developed epistemic concerns and norms.  It seems that from this example we can draw something of an alternative to conceptual analysis for the generation of philosophical hypotheses: follow Weinberg and rely on theoretical developments in other fields for epistemological ideas.

Though his methodology is unclear, we can give some sort of account of it.  It seems he is trying to uncover the principles latent in these practices.  He examines the well-established, well-regarded epistemic practices of the judiciary and attempts to formulate a set of criteria for epistemically-valuable hypotheses and processes.  In particular, he examines relevant concepts, such as justification and doubt, as they are used in these practices.  These criteria can then be exported to other practices or at least explicitly considered.  This is an example of the generalisation of criterion epistemic value I identified above.  The hopelessness criterion is found to be criterion epistemically valuable in other respectable areas and so is applied to a more contentious area where we are unsure whether we have captured fundamental epistemic value.  Since the criterion is epistemically valuable elsewhere, Weinberg argues that we ought to trust it in debates about intuition and thus should regard intuition, as currently used, as a worthless source of evidence.   

Much more work needs to be done to defend this methodology.  In particular, its features must be clarified and its substantive differences from (a more restricted form of) conceptual analysis made plain.  More importantly, for my project, it must be shown that this methodology is able to produce novel and interesting hypotheses more effectively than conceptual analysis.  It must compete with the structure of conceptual analysis, which systematically encourages the development of new and interesting hypotheses.  This structure necessitates the creative development of many varied hypotheses of the right form to be interesting in many domains.  When compared to the unoptimised and unclarified methodology of the experimentalist critics, these structural features make very plausible the epistemic value of conceptual analysis.





Responding to two objections will help to clarify my claim.  First, it may be objected that if we allow conceptual analysis to have this oblique epistemic value, we will have to allow the same for all sorts of processes which we would not normally think of as epistemically valuable.  For example, when thinking about difficult philosophical problems it may help to sit in a dark cupboard, but surely sitting in a dark cupboard is not an epistemically-valuable process.

There is a confusion about generality in this objection.  It is of the same form as the claim that entering a building will not contribute to science.  Of course, the act of entering itself does not contribute to science; for example, many people enter banks and shopping centres without any thought of science.  But sometimes when people enter buildings it does contribute to science, and does so in a more-than-accidental way.  For example, it does when Stephen Hawking enters the physics labs at Cambridge.  We can certainly say that scientists’ entering scientific buildings contributes to science in a reliable way.  The best scientific equipment is only available in these scientific buildings and so entering them helps us towards our scientific goals.  So under certain circumstances, entering buildings does contribute to science, though the act of entering buildings itself does not.  The generality of the process is important: the coarse-grained process is not valuable but the fine-grained is.  It is also important to note that no conceptual connection is required between a process and an outcome for that process to be reliable in bringing about that outcome.  It is an empirical matter whether entering buildings contributes to science.  We can only find out by examining correlations between entering buildings and contributions to science.

The objection is right insofar as sitting in a cupboard does not itself help us towards our epistemic goals.  But being free from distractions and having a long time to concentrate on a single problem certainly does, and being in a dark cupboard gives us these helpful advantages.  So it is appropriate to say that while sitting in a dark cupboard itself is not epistemically valuable, philosophers’ sitting in dark cupboards to think about difficult philosophical problems is.  I see no abuse of the language in calling such a process epistemically valuable, since we know empirically that it actually helps us towards our epistemic goals.  Similarly, conceptual analysis, as a process of reduction of concepts undertaken sincerely by philosophers, helps us towards our epistemic goals in a reliable way.

Second, it may be objected that conceptual analysis, as a process of belief formation, is unlike other epistemically-valuable processes because the hypotheses it delivers are not justified because of that delivery.  This contrasts with believing based on vision.  I believe a computer is before me because my vision tells me so and this belief is justified, at least in part, because it is based on vision.  Beliefs based on vision are, ceteris paribus, justified simply in virtue of that fact.  

The objection is sound regarding the obliquely-valuable component of conceptual analysis.  It is true that, for each hypothesis generated by conceptual analysis, we must use other processes to determine its epistemic value.  In particular, we must look to its possible applications in philosophy and elsewhere.  But, and this point is important, I am not claiming that conceptual analysis is a reliable process of interesting belief formation where reliability is taken in the very strong sense in which beliefs based on vision are reliable.  Rather, I am using it in a sense where the proportion of true beliefs produced must be above some very low threshold (see Goldman 1986, 26).  The proportion is very low but is better than we would expect from chance or accident. 

This may seem like a very weak claim, but it establishes that conceptual analysis has value of the same kind as other popular and well-respected processes of belief formation.  For instance, it is of the same kind as brainstorming.  An idea generated by brainstorming is not at all justified by that fact.  Brainstorming provides the new ideas, but the idea's value must be determined by other processes.  But still, in millions of businesses, brainstorming is an essential part of research and development.  Like conceptual analysis, it reliably provides ideas of the right form to be useful because it obeys heuristics which constrain appropriate answers.  Additionally, like conceptual analysis, it has shown itself to be reliable at producing ideas which actually are useful.  Certainly, if we, and businesses, could find a process which was reliable, in the strong sense, in producing actually useful ideas we would be considerably better off.  But as it stands, given that no systematic alternatives have been proposed, conceptual analysis, like brainstorming, gives us the best chance we have.  We might say that when doing conceptual analysis and brainstorming, it is not a happy accident that we are exposed to the happy accidents which actually turn out to be useful.  These processes increase our chances of being exposed to interesting and useful ideas.





Conceptual analysis, the reduction of complex concepts to simpler, is obliquely epistemically valuable because of its proofs and refutations structure.  The discovery of a counterexample to the conjectural analysis necessitates the search for the corresponding counterexample to an element of the analysis.  This in turn necessitates the replacement of the false element with a new element or the replacement of the conjecture with a new conjecture.  The search for these replacements is aided by the urgency created by the problem’s being manifest and by the heuristics which constrain the search to potential solutions of the right kind.  The urgency and creativity ensure that a large number of potential solutions are canvassed and the heuristics ensure that those only include relevant potential solutions.

The heuristics used to guide conceptual analysis are used extensively in other fields.  Abstract heuristics like simplicity and consistency are used in almost all theorising disciplines and similar concrete heuristics, often particularly successful uses of conceptual analysis, guide much of philosophy.  Since conceptual analysis in one philosophical discipline will be guided by these more broadly-applicable heuristics, its results will be of the right form to be applicable also to other areas of philosophy and scholarship.  The structure of conceptual analysis encourages the production of many hypotheses of this useful form.  We have seen that some theories derived from conceptual analysis have shown themselves epistemically valuable, and the structure of conceptual analysis makes it plausible that others are as well.  Since these outcomes of conceptual analysis are epistemically valuable and, I hypothesise, conceptual analysis reliably leads to such outcomes, conceptual analysis itself has epistemic value.

This epistemic value is oblique, in that it accumulates in a direction other than the goals of the process.  Conceptual analysis aims at the reduction of complex concepts to simpler, but the epistemic value is in the usefulness in other domains of the theories generated.  Even if the experimentalist critics are right and the analysis of concepts is uninteresting or misguided, and I have argued that they are wrong in this, this oblique epistemic value remains and must be acknowledged.  Indeed, it is poignant that the explanationist criterion, upon which most experimentalists depend for their criticisms of conceptual analysis, is itself a product of the conceptual analytic process.  Thus, to the extent that explanationism is epistemically valuable, conceptual analysis, the process which non-accidentally gave rise to it, is also epistemically valuable.  I have argued that this epistemic value is enough for us to regard conceptual analysis as a useful philosophical methodology and thus to provide an answer to the experimentalists.
References
Blaauw, M. 2008 "Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 82, pp. 43-57
Brandom, R. 1988 "Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism", The Monist 81, pp. 371-392
Campbell, D. T. 1960 "Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes", Psychological Reviews 67(6), pp. 380-400
Chisholm, R. 1957, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Clark, M. 1963 "Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper", Analysis 24(2), pp. 46-48
Dennett, D. 2005, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Gettier, E. L. 1963 "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis 23(6), pp. 121-123
Goldman, A. I. 1967 "A Causal Theory of Knowing", The Journal of Philosophy 64(12), pp. 357-372
——— 1979, "What is Justified Belief", in: G. S. Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-24
——— 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press
——— 1992, "Cognition and Modal Metaphysics", Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 49-66
——— 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Clarendon Press
——— 2007 "Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status", Grazer Philosophische Studien 74
Harman, G. 1965 "The Inference to the Best Explanation", The Philosophical Review 74(1), pp. 88-95
——— 1973, Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press
——— 1977, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press
Harper, A. S. 2010 "Philosophical Intuitions and the Need for an Explanation", Unpublished manuscript
Hempel, C. G. and P. Oppenheim 1948 "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", Philosophy of Science 15(2), pp. 135-175
Jackson, F. 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press
Kuhn, T. 1977, "Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice", The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 320-339
——— 1996, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Ladyman, J., D. Ross, D. Spurrett and J. Collier (eds.) 2007, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Lakatos, I., J. Worrall and E. Zahar 1976, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Lycan, W. G. 1988, "Epistemic Value", Judgement and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 128-156
——— 2006, "On the Gettier Problem Problem", in: S. C. Hetherington, ed., Epistemology Futures, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 148-168
Machado, A. and F. J. Silva 2007, "Toward a Richer View of the Scientific Method: The Role of Conceptual Analysis", American Psychologist 62(7), pp. 671-681
Pardo, M. S. and R. J. Allen 2008 "Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation", Law and Philosophy 27, pp. 223-268
Priest, G. 2005, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Pritchard, D. 2008 "Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 82, pp. 19-41
Pust, J. 2000, Intuitions as Evidence, New York: Garland
Putnam, H. 1975, "The Meaning of Meaning", Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ross, D., J. Ladyman and D. Spurrett 2007, "In Defence of Scientism", in: J. Ladyman, D. Ross, D. Spurrett and J. Collier, eds., Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-66
Salmon, W. 1989, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press
Saunders, J. T. and N. Champawat 1964 "Mr. Clark's Definition of 'Knowledge'", Analysis 25(1), pp. 8-9
Shope, R. K. 1983, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Smith, A. 1950, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London: Methuen
Stein, E. and P. Lipton 1989 "Where Guesses Come From: Evolutionary Epistemology and the Anomaly of Guided Variation", Biology and Philosophy 4, pp. 33-56
Sterelny, K. 1994 "Science and Selection", Biology and Philosophy 9, pp. 45-62
Stich, S. 1975 "Logical Form and Natural Language", Philosophical Studies 28(6), pp. 397-418
——— 1992 "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?", Mind 101, pp. 243-261
Weinberg, J. M. 2007 "How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31, pp. 318-343








^1	 	 I will designate, where it is ambiguous, concepts by italics and words by quotation marks.
^2	 	For defence of the value of conceptual analysis within a naturalistic framework acceptable to the experimentalist, see Harper (2010).
^3	 	 Jackson has a modest idea of conceptual analysis.  Certainly, there are many metaphysicians who use conceptual analysis to discover truths about the world apart from our conceptual usage.  I take this usage to be unjustified as described above.
^4	 	 It may be wondered why we are talking about truth and not truth here.  The answer is that whether or not there is a truth relation out there in the world, the philosophical debate about truth is executed by conceptual analysis and thus, if I am right above, can only illuminate our concept of truth.  We can imagine two situations which are the same in every respect except for the relation between the belief and the world and where this relation fulfils one definition of truth and not another.  In this case, it would be our concept of truth which is relevant in differentiating knowledge from non-knowledge.  This point becomes very complex where we ask whether we are talking about reduction or reduction of concepts.  I take it that we must be talking about reduction, but will neither defend that here nor amend my typography to reflect this.
^5	 	 Not all participants in the Gettier programme conceived of themselves as analyzing knowledge in this way, but we can usefully think of this as the main thrust (see Shope 1983 esp. 34-44).
^6	 	Conceptual analysis does not always exclusively concentrate on our everyday garden variety concepts.  Sometimes it is interesting to analyse technical concepts.  For example, we might compare the everyday concept of knowledge to that employed in the courtroom.  This is a different kind of conceptual analysis to the instantly-recognisable philosophical kind, but it has independent interest, especially for “philosophy of” disciplines (see Machado and Silva 2007 for an analysis of this type of conceptual analysis in psychology).	
^7	 	 There are two other possibilities for counterexamples.  We may have local and global counterexamples which have limited heuristic value because the global element of the counterexample is explained by the local element.  The whole conjecture does not apply to a case simply because one of the lemmas does not apply.  Local but not global counterexamples also occur which necessitate a reanalysis of the proof but not necessarily a new conjecture.
^8	 	 It is worth noting that Gettier counterexamples are not fantastical or merely possible.  We can imagine them happening in the real world.  Indeed, William Lycan proudly reports that he himself was given as a gift a watch which Gettiered Marshall Swain in exactly this way (2006, 151 n. 156)
^9	 	 Harman eventually had to give up this necessary condition for a more-developed one because of counterexamples like the lottery paradox (1973, 171-172).  The details of the replacement are not important here.
^10	 	 Harman does not clarify whether being a good explanation is a sufficient condition for knowledge.  That is, he does not clarify whether we only need a single condition for knowledge, or whether the explanationist criterion is added to other criteria.  Neither does he clarify whether the explanationist criterion is part of the justification condition or is itself a separate condition of knowledge.
^11	 	 Local but not global counterexamples were also provided.  For example, it is said that chicken sexers are reliably able to separate young chickens into male and female though they have no idea how they do it.  We would think that of each chicken, the sexer knows whether it is a male or female though she lacks sufficient justification (Brandom 1988).  This suggests that the justification condition as it is often conceived is not necessary for knowledge.  Of course, global and local counterexamples need not be worrying, for if a person lacks justification in a case and also lacks knowledge, it is not really a counterexample to the analysis at all (though see (Lakatos et al. 1976, 92) for heuristic uses of these counterexamples).
^12	 	As this example makes clear, the oblique value depends on the nature of the activity and the institutional arrangements which control it.  There is no oblique economic value generated by a baker poking a rat with a stick, nor would there be any if a butcher were to pursue her interest by killing rivals.  Institutions like private property and purchasing are necessary for oblique economic value.  
^13	 	 This question about the nature of fundamental epistemic value is currently hotly-debated under the name ‘epistemic value.’  I myself am becoming convinced that the best account of epistemic value in this sense must refer to some competence and achievement, but the details are not relevant for the topic at hand.  See, for example, Pritchard’s (2008) and the reply from Blaauw (2008).
^14	 	 Of course, we can also acquire fundamental epistemic value by knowing the contents of our concepts and so conceptual analysis can possess process epistemic value regarding conceptual truths even if it does not regarding extra-mental truths.
^15	 	 We have also seen in this paper that inference to the best explanation is used in philosophy itself.  When doing conceptual analysis, we infer that the best explanation of our intuitions about some subject matter is that our concepts refer to that subject in accordance with those intuitions.  We infer that our concept of right excludes malicious killing because that is the best explanation of our intuitions’ occurrence.
^16	 	 I have only demonstrated by evidence that one outcome of conceptual analysis is epistemically valuable, but it is clear that many others are as well.  Other research programmes like reliabilism in epistemology (Goldman 1967; 1979) and externalism in semantics (Putnam 1975) have been developed out of conceptual analysis and have shown themselves epistemically very valuable. 
^17	 	 Of course, this is not conceptual analysis' primary goal, rather the analysis of concepts is.  But that it also happens, as a by-product, to function reliably as a process for finding epistemically-valuable hypotheses gives it this oblique epistemic value.
^18	 	 I am using a sense of reliable where the proportion of truthful beliefs generated is very small, but still better than we would expect of chance or accident.  See below and (Goldman 1986, 26).
^19	 	 This randomness need not be truly random.  Rather, “to claim that the permutations are generated by chance is equivalent to saying that each mental element is evoked by myriad determinants” too complex for us currently to individuate (Simonton 1988, 389).
^20	 	 The generation of explanationism is perhaps a special case here because it has itself become something of an abstract rule heuristic in scholarship.  Most hypotheses generated by conceptual analysis will not be this far-reaching.
^21	 	 Weinberg argues that intuition, as currently used in philosophy, is a hopeless source of evidence.  I agree that much undisciplined intuition-pumping is hopeless but contend that, with the amendments to the methodology described above, intuitions may become more hopeful sources of evidence.
^22	 	 Of course, conceptual analysts may be convinced by my arguments that conceptual analysis is a good way to generate new and interesting ideas and so this may become one of their goals in doing conceptual analysis.  In this case, what is normally oblique value would become direct value.  Conceptual analysis would be achieving its aims.  
